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Improvements in environmental quality depend in large measure on changes in
private sector management. In recognition of this fact, government and industry have
begun in recent years to focus directly on shaping the internal management practices of
private firms. New management-based strategies can take many forms, but unlike
conventional regulatory approaches they are linked by their distinctive focus on
management practices, rather than on environmental technologies or emissions targets.
This article offers the first sustained analysis of both public and private sector initiatives
designed specifically to improve firms’ environmental management. Synthesizing the
results of a conference of leading scholars and policymakers organized by the Regulatory
Policy Program at Harvard University, we consider in this article whether managementbased strategies can lead to improved environmental outcomes and, if so, how they
should be designed to be most effective. We report research findings showing that
management-based strategies can yield improvements in industry’s environmental
performance, indicating that anyone concerned about environmental quality should
seriously consider the use of these strategies. Nevertheless, we urge caution about
overstating what can be accomplished through management-based strategies, as they will
not always lead to significant change in private sector firms’ environmental performance.
Although management-based strategies deserve greater consideration because they can
yield positive results, these results are unlikely to be significant or reliable enough to
make such strategies the mainstay of society’s approach to environmental protection.
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Improvements in environmental quality depend in large measure on decisions
made by private-sector managers. For decades, government regulators and others
interested in environmental protection tried to affect these decisions by altering
incentives so that businesses would achieve a desired level of emissions or would adopt
specified pollution control technologies. While these traditional performance-based and
technology-based regulatory strategies have worked well to spur private managers to
make the investments needed to reduce some of their firms’ negative environmental
impacts,1 they have tended to treat the firm itself as a “black box,” imposing requirements
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for specific means or outcomes without regard for the overall way that firms manage their
environmental impacts.2
More recently, both government and industry have begun to explore innovative
alternatives that seek directly to shape the internal management practices of private firms.
Rather than treating private firms as proverbial black boxes, these new strategies focus
squarely on management and seek to provide incentives for firms to develop management
practices that in turn can lead to improved environmental outcomes. Government and the
private sector are using management-based strategies to address a broad range of
environmental concerns. For example, in Massachusetts, the legislature has attempted to
reduce the risks from toxic chemicals not by requiring managers of manufacturing
facilities to meet emissions limits or to install pollution control technology, but instead by
requiring them to engage in management effort to develop toxic use reduction plans.3
Similarly, U.S. automakers require their suppliers to adopt environmental management
systems as a requirement for doing business,4 and the American Forest and Paper
Association requires its members to adopt a set of management practices directed toward
sustainable forestry.5
Decision makers in government and the private sector are turning to managementbased strategies for several reasons. These strategies take advantage of the fact that
2

JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (2003)
(“[E]nvironmental law as a whole treats factories as giant black boxes, refusing to look at what happens
inside.”)
3
Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 21I.
4
Press Release, Ford Motor Company, Ford Becomes First U.S. Automaker to Require Suppliers to
Achieve ISO 14001 Certification (Sept. 21, 1999) (on file with author); Press Release, General Motors
Corporation, General Motors Sets New Level of Environmental Performance for Suppliers (Sept. 21, 1999)
(on file with author); see also R.C. Wilson, Ford Spreads the Word about Its EMS Success, 33 POLLUTION
ENGINEERING 6 (2001).
5
Errol Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 211, 239
(2003); Jennifer Nash, Industry Codes of Practice: Emergence and Evolution, in NEW TOOLS FOR
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private-sector managers have the best knowledge about how to bring about appropriate
changes within their organizations and industries.6 Management-based strategies seek to
leverage the private sector’s informational advantage by encouraging managers to
identify and reduce their facilities’ most significant impacts. Interest in managementbased strategies is also fueled by the perception that conventional regulatory strategies
may be ill suited for addressing the environmental problems most vexing to policy
makers today. For example, problems such as chemical accidents, which are often the
result of dynamic interactions inside organizations, are not easy for regulators to solve
using technology- or performance-based tools.7 A management-based strategy that
requires managers to identify sources of risk, develop a plan for addressing them, and
monitor the implementation of their plans might be a more effective approach. Finally,
people are turning to management-based strategies simply out of growing acceptance that
what goes on inside the black box of the firm is of critical importance for overall
environmental quality. The size of a firm’s environmental footprint is not pre-determined
by the raw materials it uses and the products or services it produces. Firms working in
the same sector – and subject to the same competitive and regulatory pressures – can
have starkly different environmental profiles depending on how they are managed.
To explore the promise and the performance of management-based strategies for
environmental improvement, the Regulatory Policy Program at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University organized a research conference that

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EDUCATION, INFORMATION, AND VOLUNTARY MEASURES 235, 237
(Thomas Dietz and Paul C. Stern eds., 2002).
6
Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to
Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 695 (2003) (management-based approaches “place
responsibility for [decision making] with those who possess the most information about risks and potential
control methods.”).
7
CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES (1984).
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brought together some of the nation’s leading scholars as well as leaders from
government, business, and non-governmental organizations. The conference aimed to
evaluate experiences with management-based strategies and draw lessons for future
public and private sector developments. This article synthesizes and extends central
themes and issues that emerged from the conference discussion and highlights unresolved
issues that merit further research.
We begin by defining what we mean by management-based strategies and
offering examples of their use by both the public and private sectors. We then turn to the
role of management in organizations and explore the issue of how much management
affects environmental performance compared with other social, economic, and regulatory
variables. We then consider four empirical studies of the impact of different applications
of management-based strategies. The results of this research suggest that managementbased strategies can sometimes play a role in bringing about improvements in firms’
environmental performance. To be sure, the effectiveness of management-based
strategies is by no means assured or always significant; their success depends on the
conditions under which they are used as well as the way that they are designed.
Important design considerations include the incentives that are offered; whether the
strategy seeks to promote management planning by itself or also the implementation of
plans; the specificity of any standards for management practices; the amount and type of
information collected by the firm and shared with outsiders; the role of auditing; and the
nature and level of stakeholder involvement. We conclude by examining the question of
when management-based strategies are likely to be more effective than traditional
performance- and technology-based approaches.

4

What are Management-Based Strategies?
Management refers to the coordination of an organization’s operational activities
toward a specified set of objectives.8 It includes practices such as planning, goal setting,
staffing, training, analysis, and control. Such management practices have long been used
by businesses and are by now ubiquitous throughout industry. Every day, private sector
managers use planning, monitoring, analysis, training, and control to achieve business
objectives such as improving the efficiency of their operations or the quality of their
products and services.
What we call management-based strategies are attempts to require or encourage a
set of targeted firms or organizations to use basic management practices in ways that
align their actions and outcomes with broader social objectives. Management-based
strategies, as we define them, are used by those outside an organization to change the
management practices and behaviors of those on the inside. Government regulators, for
example, have used management-based strategies in a variety of important areas,
including pharmaceuticals, food safety, and health care institutions.9 In the
8

MORGAN WIZEL, MANAGEMENT: THE BASICS (2004).
In its regulation of the quality of pharmaceuticals, the FDA is moving toward a management-based
framework called the “Pharmaceutical Current Good Manufacturing Practice,” which when finalized will
seek to encourage industry managers to implement systems to identify, analyze, fix, and prevent quality
problems. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Pharmaceutical cGMPs for the 21st Century – A RiskBased Approach, Final Report, available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/gmp/gmp2004/GMP_finalreport2004.htm. FDA and the USDA are also using a
management-based strategy to improve the safety of juice, seafood, and meat by requiring firms to
implement a system called Hazards Analysis and Critical Control Point (HAACP) to identify and control
pathogens. FDA, Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing of Juice, 66 Fed. Reg.
6137 (Jan. 19, 2001) (to be codified at 21 CFR Part 120); FDA, Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary
Processing and Importing of Fish and Fishery Products. 60 Fed. Reg. 65095 (Dec. 18, 1995) (to be codified
at 21 CFR Parts 123 and 1240); USDA, Final Rule on Pathogen Reduction and HACCP Systems, 61 Fed.
Reg. 38,806 (1996). The accreditation standards for hospitals have become similarly management-based.
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Hospital Patient Safety Standards (July 1,
2001), available at http://www.jcrinc.com/subscribers/perspectives.
9
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environmental domain, both government agencies and various private sector institutions
are using management-based strategies to achieve a broad range of objectives. Examples
include:
•

Both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have adopted management-based
regulations in an effort to prevent catastrophic accidents at facilities that use large
quantities of hazardous chemicals.10 Under these rules, industrial facilities must
engage in a risk assessment of their operations, develop procedures designed to
prevent accidents, and seek to make continuous improvements in the management
of their operations.11

•

The EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track, the agency’s flagship
voluntary environmental program, recognizes and rewards firms that have met
regulatory requirements, implemented environmental management systems, and
set goals for making further environmental improvements.12 Several states,
including Texas and Virginia, have adopted similar programs.13

•

The American Chemistry Council requires chemical manufacturing firms to
implement a Responsible Care management system and have it externally verified

asp?durki=2973&site=10&return=2897; see generally TROYEN A. BRENNAN & DONALD M. BERWICK,
NEW RULES : REGULATION, MARKETS, AND THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (1995).
10
Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals, 57 Fed. Reg. 6,356 (Feb. 24, 1992) (to be
codified at 29 CFR Part 1910); Accidental Release Prevention Requirements, 61 Fed. Reg. 31,668-01
(June 20, 1996) (to be codified at 40 CFR); see generally Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 6, at 698-99.
11
Id.
12
See generally, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TRACK, BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION,
PERFORMANCE TRACK SECOND ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT (2004), available at
http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/PT_2nd_progress_rpt_FINAL.pdf.
13
Memorandum of Agreement between the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (Apr. 24, 2002), available at
http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/states/programs/va_moa.pdf; Memorandum of Agreement between
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as a condition for membership. Managers must implement management practices
to engage the community, prevent pollution, and operate their plants safely,
among other objectives.14
•

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has developed an
environmental management system standard, known as ISO 14001, that facilities
anywhere in the world can use as a guide for managing their environmental
impacts. ISO 14001 calls for facilities to develop a system for setting their own
firm-specific environmental performance goals, and then for assessing progress
and correcting problems.15
As these examples show, management-based strategies can take a wide variety of

forms and can be adopted by a variety of organizations, including government agencies,
trade associations, and other standard-setting bodies. Nevertheless, they share in
common a clear focus on management itself. They all directly seek to influence the
attention, information, authority, and financial resources of managers toward the
achievement of environmental improvements, but without necessarily requiring them to
achieve any specific outcomes and while also giving them the flexibility to choose their
own measures to reduce their environmental impacts.
Management-based strategies can be classified into four types, depending on what
kind of institution uses them and the types of incentives that accompany them. We

the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/states/programs/tx_moa.pdf.
14
Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions: The Chemical
Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT J. 698, 699-700 (2000).
15
Jennifer Nash et. al., ISO 14001 and EPA’s Region I’s Startrack Program, in RESEARCH PAPERS 2, VOL.
1 OF ENVIRONMENT: TRANSFORMING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 15-17; Jerry
Speir, EMSs and Tiered Regulation: Getting the Deal Right, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE, 198, 217
(Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001) (“ISO 14001 guarantees no particular level of performance,
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distinguish between management-based strategies deployed by governmental and nongovernmental institutions. We then distinguish between management-based strategies
that mandate management practices and those that encourage the adoption of improved
environmental management. These two distinctions lead to the typology of managementbased strategies shown in Figure 1. When a government agency such as the U.S. EPA
requires a business to strengthen its internal management, it is engaging in managementbased regulation. When a private organization such as a firm or trade association
imposes a similar requirement on its suppliers or members, it is issuing a managementbased mandate. When government establishes a program to coax (but not require) firms
to improve their environmental management, it uses management-based incentives.
When a private organization initiates a similar effort to encourage others to improve their
management, it is creating management-based pressure.
In these various ways, governmental and non-governmental institutions are
increasingly requiring or encouraging firms to improve their internal management
practices as a way to improve their environmental performance. But are these
management-based strategies in fact affecting the environmental performance of
companies? Why should anyone expect that management-based strategies would lead
firms to reduce their environmental footprints?

and without supplementation, it provides no public information by which to judge an organizations
performance.”).
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Figure 1. Types of Management-Based Strategies

Management
Required

Management
Encouraged

Governmental User

Non-Governmental User

Management-based
regulation

Management-based
mandate

Examples:
• Risk management planning
required under Clean Air Act
§ 112(r)16
• Massachusetts Toxics Use
Reduction Act17

Examples:
• American Chemistry Council’s
Responsible Care Program18
• Ford Motor Company’s
requirement that suppliers
become certified to ISO 1400119

Management-based
incentive

Management-based
pressure

Examples:
• U.S. EPA’s National
Environmental Performance
Track20
• Texas Natural Resource
Conservation Commission’s
Clean Texas Program21
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Examples:
• Portland Cement Association’s
Cement Manufacturing
Sustainability Program22
• International Organization for
Standardization’s (ISO) 14001
Standard23

See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
18
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
19
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
20
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
21
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission Clean Texas Program, available at
http://www.cleantexas.org/.
22
Press Release, Portland Cement Association, Cement Industry Adopts Environmental Management
Systems (August 5, 2004) available at http://www.cement.org/newsroom/ems20040805.asp; Cement
Manufacturing Sustainability Program Plans for Future Generations available at
http://www.cement.org/bookstore/profile.asp?store=&pagenum=1&pos=0&catID=&id=5728.
23
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 14001 – ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS – SPECIFICATION WITH GUIDANCE FOR USE (1996).
17
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Does Management Matter?
In order for management-based strategies to work, management itself must be an
important factor causally related to environmental outcomes. Is management the right
place to look for improvements in environmental performance? How much does
management matter? The opening session of the Regulatory Policy Program’s
conference addressed these initial questions.
The session began with a presentation by Robert A. Kagan, of the University of
California, Berkeley, in which he reported findings from a study of pulp and paper mills
in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.24 Kagan and his research
collaborators found that firms exhibited different management styles reflecting managers’
attitudes towards environmental issues, their responsiveness to various pressures for
environmental improvement, and the steps they took to implement environmental
policies. Kagan classified firms’ environmental management styles into five ideal
types.25 These ideal types include, on one end of the spectrum, the “true believers” who
voluntarily invest in state-of-the-art practices and actively search for ways to improve
their performance even beyond what they are required to do by law. At the other end of
the spectrum lie “environmental laggards” who resist even complying with their basic
legal obligations. In between these two extremes are “environmental strategists,”
“committed compliers,” and “reluctant compliers,” each of whom have varying degrees
of commitment to excellence in managing their operations in ways that go beyond what
they are required to do by law.
24

See Robert A. Kagan, Environmental Management Style and Corporate Environmental Performance, in
LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL
PERFORMANCE (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., forthcoming 2005); see also ROBERT A KAGAN, ET
AL., SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND ENVIRONMENT (2003).
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Kagan has found that management style is an important factor influencing
environmental performance. Not surprisingly, true believers and environmental
strategists achieve better environmental results than those that do not comply with
regulations or only comply reluctantly. Firms that are committed and systematic about
managing their environmental impacts tend to perform better in terms of their impact on
environmental quality than firms that are not so managed, all other things being equal.
Of course, all other things are not always equal. Firms’ environmental
performance is affected by more than just management style. Both performance and style
itself can be affected by community demands, regulatory enforcement, and economic
considerations, such as the financial strength of the company or its customers’ demands
for environmental quality. The importance of these factors was confirmed not only by
the Kagan study of pulp and paper facilities, but also by the findings from an extensive
statistical analysis presented at the conference by Paul R. Kleindorfer, of the University
of Pennsylvania.26 Drawing on an analysis of nearly 2,000 chemical accidents at more
than 15,000 chemical facilities, Kleindorfer reported that economic, regulatory, and
community factors are all important drivers of accident and injury rates in this important
industrial sector.27
The research presented at the conference highlighted three important, but as yet
unanswered, questions that hold clear implications for understanding and use of
management-based strategies. First, why do firms vary in their environmental
management style? In other words, why are some managers true believers or
25

Id.
See Paul R. Kleindorfer, The RMP Rule and Management-Based Regulations, in LEVERAGING THE
PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
(Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., forthcoming 2005).
26

11

environmental strategists who treat environmental management as a high priority, while
others are only reluctant compliers? This is a crucial question for anyone interested in
management-based strategies, since such strategies aim at improving firms’
environmental management. One answer, of course, is that the enforcement of old-style
regulations affects managers’ environmental priorities and commitment. Although
traditional regulation may treat firms as black boxes, it nevertheless provides strong
incentives for firms to improve their environmental management. Some firms that are
now widely perceived to be environmental leaders were previously the targets of major
regulatory enforcement actions that helped their managers “wake up” to environmental
aspects of their operations.28
Participants mentioned a range of additional factors that may explain why some
firms take environmental management more seriously than others. These factors include:
the personal beliefs of corporations’ top managers; the social pressures that they face in
their personal lives or in their communities, including the impact of consumer boycotts or
community protests; the strategic position firms face within their sectors; and the extent
to which firms’ managers believe there is a strong business case for sound environmental
management.29 A few participants expressed the view that management style is largely
idiosyncratic, determined mainly by who is sitting at the top of a company’s hierarchy
and what that person figuratively “had for lunch” on any given day.
27

Id.
See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental Management Systems and the New Policy
Agenda, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE, 1, 2 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001) (discussing
“[t]he experience of the Louisiana-Pacific Corporation”).
29
For general discussion of such factors, see KAGAN ET AL., supra note 24; ASEEM PRAKASH, GREENING OF
THE FIRM: THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM (2000); FOREST REINHARDT, DOWN TO
EARTH: APPLYING BUSINESS PRINCIPLES TO ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (1999).
28
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Second, what is the relative importance of each of the social, economic,
regulatory, and management factors that affect firms’ environmental performance?
While conference participants recognized that each of these types of factors shapes
managers’ actions, some factors are likely to be more important than others. A few
conference participants expressed the view that an often unobservable factor – managers’
attitudes or commitment – might be the most important factor because it not only directly
affects the seriousness of a firm’s management practices, but it may also serve as a filter
through which managers and their employees differentially perceive the impact of the
other factors, such as community, regulatory, and financial pressures. An important but
still unresolved issue for research will be to assess the degree to which management
practices and managers’ commitment independently contribute as much as other factors
do to a firm’s environmental performance.
Finally, how should researchers study the role of management in shaping firms’
environmental performance? Several participants noted the need to develop reliable
ways of defining and measuring management in concrete terms using observable
characteristics so that researchers can test for correlation between management and
environmental performance. Without such measures, it is easy to conflate managers’
attitudes and their actions in describing firms’ management styles, when attitudes and
actions might be separate factors affecting corporate environmental performance.30 For
example, the mere fact that a facility has implemented an ISO14001-compliant
environmental management system (EMS) might itself lead to improvements in firms’
performance, such that the environmental impacts of firms with such EMSs tend to be
30

For a discussion of the difference between management commitment and performance, see Coglianese &
Nash, supra note 28, at 16-18.
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systematically more benign than comparable firms without such EMSs. But there still
could be differences among firms with EMSs, such that those firms with both an EMS
and managers with strong, pro-environment attitudes perform still better. As one
participant with extensive experience in environmental management consulting noted,
companies that implement EMSs because they want to manage themselves well will
experience better results than companies that are pressured to implement EMSs.
Alternatively, it could be that implementing an EMS by itself makes no difference
at all, and that firms with strong pro-environment attitudes improve their performance
over firms without these attitudes, regardless of whether they have a formal EMS in
place. One participant posited that the presence of an EMS is merely “an epiphenomenon
but not the ‘first cause’” of most firms’ performance improvements, suggesting that the
same factors that motivate firms to implement an EMS could also motivate these firms to
improve their environmental performance even without an EMS.
On the other hand, despite being well intentioned and having a strong commitment
to the environment, many managers may be unable to make strides to reduce their firms’
environmental impacts without a formal environmental management system in place.
Performance improvements may very well depend on the interaction of both attitudes and
actions.
Participants did not resolve the issue of the relative importance of attitudes versus
actions, but the conference discussion did highlight the importance of this issue for those
who are deciding whether to pursue management-based strategies. After all, if the
attitudes or commitment of managers matter most in affecting firms’ environmental
performance, then simply requiring firms to implement certain management actions will

14

probably not lead to the expected performance improvements. If managers need to
change their attitudinal commitment in order for management to matter, it may be much
harder to accomplish improved firm performance through types of management-based
strategies.31

The Impact of Management-Based Strategies
Management-based strategies provide incentives for firms to engage in
management actions or practices, but they do not necessarily seek to change managers’
attitudes. Government regulators, trade associations, and community groups who seek to
encourage or require firms to improve their environmental management cannot observe
or measure attitudes nearly as easily as actions. Management-based strategies therefore
focus on rewarding or punishing firms based on their management practices. What
impact do strategies that seek to improve management practices ultimately have on firms’
environmental performance?
At the conference, presenters focused on the environmental impacts associated
with management-based strategies, reporting findings from systematic studies aimed at
assessing whether these strategies have had demonstrable effects on firms’ environmental
31

Although there may be reasons to believe that managers’ attitudes matter independent of certain actions,
researchers face difficulties in measuring managers’ attitudes directly. Since it will be socially acceptable
for managers to proclaim their attitudinal commitment to environmental protection, no matter how
important it really is to them, surveys and structured interviews with managers may not result in valid or
accurate attitudinal measures. Fine-grained content analysis of open-ended interview questions may result
in better measures of attitudes. Alternatively, one participant suggested that it is appropriate to take
managers’ actions into account as a way of testing the validity of any attempt to ask managers about their
attitudes. Such an approach would use managers’ actions effectively as a way of approximating their
revealed preferences about environmental protection. Yet following such an approach, another participant
noted, poses its own challenges. Researchers seeking ultimately to untangle the separate effects of attitudes
and actions would want to observe actions that reveal managers’ attitudes but do not correlate with
environmental performance. This will probably be difficult to do, since the actions of committed managers
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performance. Most of the innovative, management-based efforts at the center of these
studies have been in existence for at least a decade, but until now have yet to receive any
sustained empirical scrutiny.32 As a result, the empirical studies presented at the
conference shed new light on a variety of prominent public and private initiatives
developed over the last decade. These studies include the following:
Lori Snyder Bennear of Duke University conducted an empirical evaluation of
state laws requiring managers to develop pollution prevention plans.33 During the
early 1990s, fourteen states implemented laws requiring industrial facilities to
engage in planning to reduce their use of toxic chemicals. From a theoretical
perspective, Bennear demonstrated that management-based regulation could be
effective at reducing toxic chemical releases both by changing the internal
decision-making of the plant and through information sharing between regulated
entities and the regulator. Bennear also presented new empirical evidence
demonstrating that plants subject to such management-based regulations have
experienced greater reductions in toxic chemical releases than they would have in
the absence of these regulatory initiatives. She showed that facilities subject to
these regulations reduced toxic chemicals by nearly 60,000 pounds more than
comparable facilities not subject to the regulations.34
Richard N.L. Andrews of the University of North Carolina shared findings from a
study of management-based mandates imposed by industrial customers on their

that lead to the largest improvements in environmental performance are likely to be the best signals of
managers’ attitudes.
32
Lori Snyder Bennear & Cary Coglianese, Evaluating Environmental Policies ENVIRONMENT
(forthcoming 2005).
33
Lori Snyder Bennear, Evaluating Management-Based Regulation: A Valuable Tool in the Regulatory
Toolbox?, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., forthcoming 2005).
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suppliers.35 Andrews and his collaborators surveyed 3,200 manufacturing
facilities in four sectors, comparing the self-reported environmental performance
of facilities that adopted formal EMSs in order to comply with customer mandates
with the self-reported performance of firms that were not subject to an EMS
mandate and had not implemented one.36 Their survey results suggested that the
mandates led to improved performance in some aspects of firms’ operations but
not others. Managers in companies that had implemented an EMS in response to
a business mandate reported more improvements in energy use, recycling, and
reductions in spills and leaks compared with managers in companies without an
EMS. No significant differences emerged, however, between companies in other
aspects of environmental performance.37
Jason Scott Johnston of the University of Pennsylvania shared the results from an
empirical study of the effectiveness of EPA’s Strategic Goals Program (SGP), a
management-based voluntary program established between EPA and the metal
finishing industry in 1998.38 SGP aimed to spur firms to adopt improved
management practices and meet ambitious “beyond compliance” performance
goals. Although upwards of 300 firms joined SGP and demonstrated reductions
in environmental impacts compared with a 1992 baseline, Johnston concluded
34

Id.
Richard N.L. Andrews, et. al., Environmental Management Under Pressure: How Do Private Sector
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that the impact from the SGP program itself was at best limited. SGP did help in
disseminating information about pollution prevention throughout the sector, but
many of the environmental improvements made by participating firms occurred
before the program was launched in 1998. Moreover, the program only attracted
a small percentage of all the shops in the metal finishing sector.39
Tapas Ray and Kathleen Segerson of the University of Connecticut studied the
impact of an EPA management-based effort called the Clean Charles Initiative.40
In the Clean Charles project, government served as the standard-bearer of an
ecosystem-wide performance management initiative that led to significant
improvements in water quality on the Charles River in Boston. Ray and Segerson
showed how EPA’s efforts to focus management attention on water quality also
brought greater focus to government inspections and enforcement actions, and
they argued that these enforcement actions taken in response to the government’s
goal setting played a major role in spurring improvements in environmental
management and water quality.41

Overall, these results suggest the impacts of management-based strategies can vary
from clearly positive to marginal to nonexistent. Conference discussion focused on why
these strategies might work at all in those cases where they do. A key factor, according
to several participants, lies with the information management-based strategies generate.
Management-based strategies generally call upon firms to invest in the production of
39
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information about the environmental risks created by their operations and about
alternative mitigation measures, as well as to develop procedures for continued
monitoring and information collection. The information generated through management
systems leads to behavioral change either by (a) providing feedback directly to decision
makers within firms about ways to reduce potential liabilities, or (b) informing
stakeholders who in turn bring pressure to bear upon the firms’ decision makers.42
Several participants used the oft-used expression that “what gets measured, gets
managed” to suggest that knowledge of any environmental problem is a necessary
condition for managers to find a solution.
Management-based strategies seek to provide incentives for managers to invest in
information gathering. Without such incentives, firms may not always find it in their
interest to gather the information they need to identify potential opportunities for
environmental improvement, even when these opportunities might bring business
advantages to the firm.43 This is because finding so-called win-win opportunities is not
cost-free. Even if the expected business benefits were positive, they might not be
significant enough for managers to justify spending the time and resources needed to
identify the win-win options in the first place. When government agencies or customers
either mandate planning or offer firms incentives to engage in such planning, firms more
readily invest in the search for win-win opportunities. Once firms undertake a search for
information in response to these incentives, they will be inclined to implement those
opportunities they find that both benefit the environment and their bottom line.
41
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Conference discussions also examined why management-based strategies might
not work as well as some would hope. A key issue affecting the degree to which
management-based strategies succeed in bringing about environmental improvement,
according to many participants, is the adequacy of incentives. Several participants
stressed that behavioral change requires either changed attitudes or sufficient incentives,
but they questioned whether management-based strategies could generate either. Without
changed attitudes or adequate incentives, firms may simply go through the motions by
creating management systems that make little difference in terms of environmental
outcomes.44
Many participants agreed that the most significant environmental improvements
depend upon large capital investments or markedly different business strategies. They
doubted whether any management-based strategy by itself could lead firms to make such
major changes and suggested the need for government regulation to mandate the use of
specific technologies or impose stringent performance standards that necessitate that
firms make significant investments or changes in their business strategies. Furthermore,
many firms lack the capacity to make significant environmental improvements,
regardless of the incentives available through management-based strategies. Large,
multinational firms often have the capacity to implement sophisticated and meaningful
management systems, but similar progress probably cannot be expected of small-to44
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medium sized enterprises or businesses facing a high level of global competition or tight
profit margins.45
A few participants expressed skepticism about the efficacy of management-based
strategies due to the reluctance of the private sector to make substantial investments in
environmental protection. One participant argued that private-sector initiatives, such as
trade association codes of environmental management, are inherently weak because
industry groups face collective action problems and have a tendency to promulgate
management standards based on the lowest common denominator. Another participant
suggested that even government management-based initiatives have been watered down
due to pressures from industry during implementation.
Finally, the costs of implementing management systems should not be overlooked;
these costs are nontrivial. For example, one participant surmised that complying with the
paperwork requirements of the Clean Air Act’s risk management rule – a managementbased regulation – demands in the aggregate close to 100,000 hours of management time
each year and costs tens of millions of dollars.46 A key question for future analysis will
be whether the costs of generating information in response to management-based
strategies are justified in light of the magnitude of environmental benefits that result.
Ultimately, the net benefits of management-based strategies (that is, environmental
benefits minus compliance costs) should be compared with the net benefits from
45
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alternative environmental strategies, including the adoption of more conventional forms
of regulation.
The conference discussion addressed several potential complications and
challenges for researchers wishing to study the impact of management-based strategies.
A few participants suggested that, absent large capital investments in pollution control
technologies, the environmental improvements associated with systematic environmental
management are likely to be marginal and spread across a variety of areas within a firm’s
operations. Consequently, researchers choosing a single measure of environmental
performance may well fail to observe any dramatic impact from management-based
strategies, even though the cumulative effect of the individual improvements made across
all areas could be significant. Similarly, several participants suggested that the impacts
from management-based efforts would be less observable in the short-term, but more
likely to occur over the longer term. This is because information generated through
improved management takes time to flow throughout a firm to product designers and
process engineers, and consequently the most substantial effects from management
systems may not occur until the next time the company develops a new product line or
production process.
The results from the studies presented at the conference indicate that managementbased strategies do not always yield dramatic impacts. However, even when
management-based strategies do not result in observable changes in firms’ performance,
this does not definitively resolve the larger question about the impact of management
itself. It could be possible either that firms have not fully responded to the strategies
(perhaps due to insufficient incentives) or that these strategies have simply prompted
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firms to adopt the wrong kind of management practices. The variation in results from
across the empirical studies suggests that the impact of management-based strategies may
depend ultimately on the incentives they provide to firms to improve their environmental
management as well as the way these strategies are designed.

The Design of Management Systems
As we have seen, management-based strategies do not represent a single approach
but actually different kinds of efforts aimed at improving companies’ environmental
management and performance.47 Although they share the purpose of fostering effective
management, these strategies can differ along at least two major dimensions that we have
described, either one of which could make a difference in the outcomes achieved.
Whether the initiating institution is governmental or nongovernmental, and whether
improved management is required or simply encouraged, will shape the ultimate impact
of these management-based strategies. In addition, participants at the conference
identified a variety of other potentially relevant differences in the design of managementbased strategies. These other design features include:
•

Planning versus Implementation. Management-based strategies can
encourage or require planning only (leaving it up to firms to decide on their
own whether to implement some or all of their plans), or they can provide
incentives for firms both to engage in planning and to implement their plans.

•

Types of Management Actions. The types of actions required or encouraged
by management-based strategies can vary. For example, some management-
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based strategies call for employee training as part of the preferred
management system, while others do not. Some call for managers to establish
goals consistent with clearly stated performance targets, while others do not
stipulate performance targets expected from managers and their goals.
•

Specificity of Actions. Expectations for planning and management actions can
be general or specific. For example, some state pollution prevention planning
laws call for firms to do little more than adopt “appropriate” plans, while other
management-based regulations call for firms to develop plans that meet
detailed and extensive criteria.

•

Information Collection. Different management-based strategies call for firms
to collect different kinds of information. In addition, there are differences in
whether information and records are to be kept by the firms themselves, or
whether they should be released to others, including the public or government.

•

Auditing. The extent of any auditing, as well as the type of auditor, can vary.
Since the incentives offered by different strategies are contingent on firms
taking the specified management actions, some attention to auditing is needed.
Verification that firms have taken the specified actions can be conducted
frequently or infrequently, on an announced or unannounced basis, and by
government or third-party auditors.

•

Stakeholder Involvement. Sometimes firms are expected to engage with
community or environmental groups as part of their environmental
management process.

47
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A key challenge in the development of management-based approaches to environmental
policy will be to identify which of these design elements, or which combinations of these
elements, yield the most successful outcomes under specific conditions. In addition,
when drawing inferences from empirical studies, the possible differences in the design of
management-based strategies should also be taken into account. Even though a research
study may show that a particular strategy does (or does not) have an observable impact
on firms’ environmental performance, it is possible that other strategies with different
design elements will yield different results.
Participants posited three criteria or characteristics needed to make managementbased strategies effective. First, the user of the strategy – such as government or a trade
association – should have a clear goal in mind and communicate that goal to firms and
other interested organizations. The Clean Charles Initiative provides a good example
because the EPA communicated a concrete goal of achieving fishable and swimmable
water quality by 2005.48
Second, an effective strategy should be tied to metrics so that firms’ performance
can be reliably measured and compared, both over time and across firms. If the strategy
calls for actions or outcomes that are stated too loosely or cannot be meaningfully
verified, then the quality of firms’ management efforts will be difficult to assess for the
purpose of granting a reward or imposing a punishment.
Finally, to be effective, management-based strategies need to provide firms with
adequate incentives to take appropriate management measures. If the incentives are
largely punitive, such as government fines or the revocation of a purchasing arrangement,
48
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the threat that noncompliance will be identified and punished needs to be credible. If the
incentive takes the form of rewards, the benefits firms receive must be sufficient to
induce firms to undertake serious environmental efforts. As one participant put it, any
carrots that are offered should also be the size of sticks – that is, their absolute value
should be at least as large as that of applicable civil penalties in order to be effective.

Involvement of Third Parties in Environmental Management
The role for so-called stakeholder involvement in management-based strategies
generated considerable discussion.49 Many conference participants called for a larger
role for external stakeholders in the design and review of firms’ environmental
management systems. These groups could help ensure that managers assess their firms’
environmental impacts appropriately, set reasonable objectives and targets, devote an
appropriate level of resources to implementing and maintaining the system, and put into
place effective mechanisms to identify and correct performance problems. Some
participants argued that involvement by community officials and organizations in a firm’s
environmental management could deliver important, but perhaps intangible, value to
businesses. Another participant stated that private-sector managers appear increasingly
to be open to involving external stakeholders in their environmental management.
Management-based strategies that seek to institutionalize community involvement may
succeed in creating ways to keep the pressure on firms to make continuous
improvements.
49
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A number of participants pointed to limitations in relying on stakeholder
involvement. One set of problems involves identifying stakeholders: Who are the
stakeholders for any given industrial facility? How should firms identify a complete or
balanced group of stakeholders? One participant wondered whether the challenges
associated with identifying all the relevant stakeholders would even require the creation
of an “administrative law at the level of the firm,” whereby firms provide public notice of
changes to their management plans and provide opportunities for outsiders to comment
on these plans.
A further problem is that community and environmental organizations often lack
the resources to make a meaningful contribution to companies’ development and
implementation of management systems.50 Local groups often lack sufficient technical
expertise about industrial operations, and the large, national environmental organizations
that possess greater expertise lack the organizational presence and staffing needed to help
design and monitor the management at facilities across the country. Furthermore, one
participant from industry noted that the experts in environmental groups seldom express
much interest in management per se, tending instead to focus their efforts directly on
facilities’ environmental performance or the adoption of specific pollution control
technologies.
A paper by Andrew King, of Dartmouth’s Tuck School of Business, highlighted a
final problem with stakeholder involvement.51 King acknowledged that environmental
organizations could bring value to industry efforts to adopt innovative approaches to
50
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environmental management, particularly by signaling to others that a company’s efforts
are responsible. This signaling function could be particularly valuable for certain kinds
of environmental risks that lack clear technological fixes or performance measures (at
least short of a catastrophe). After all, what constitutes good management will often not
be clear to an outside observer, such as a regulator or trade association, so the existence
of stakeholder involvement in a firm’s environmental management lends credibility to
that firm’s efforts. However, King argued that the same reason stakeholders provide this
credibility – namely that their interests are not aligned with those of industry – also limits
the degree to which companies may be willing to involve them in their management.52 In
particular, King emphasized that environmental organizations have an interest in seeing
innovative industrial practices adopted at one firm diffuse throughout an industry, while
businesses’ interests generally lie in keeping information about their operations from
their competitors.53
A related issue in designing management-based strategies centers on the auditing
of firms’ management practices.54 Stakeholder involvement may lend some credibility to
a firm’s management efforts, but if firms are to be rewarded for adopting certain
management practices, or punished for not doing so, it will be necessary to know which
firms have acted in ways meriting reward or punishment. Who will conduct needed
audits? Many participants questioned whether government agencies have sufficient
51
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resources and personnel for auditing and suggested that third-party auditing be
considered.
Howard Kunreuther, Shelley Metzenbaum, and Peter Schmeidler presented a
paper investigating the potential for linking mandatory insurance with private
inspections.55 Insurers have incentives to conduct inspections of firms in order to make
premium ratings and reduce claims. To a much greater extent than other third-party
auditors, who are normally paid for their services by the audited firm, insurance
companies have a strong interest in reducing risks. Furthermore, the costs of the
inspections would be paid for in the premiums firms pay, thus providing a way to
overcome the government’s resource constraints. Kunreuther, Metzenbaum, and
Schmeidler propose that pilot studies be undertaken to assess the impact of mandatory
insurance on specific environmental, health, or safety problems.56 They conclude that a
mandatory insurance problem would not necessarily substitute for, or eliminate the need
for, conventional regulation and government inspections, but it could offer a complement
to them.57

Management-Based Strategies and Conventional Regulation
The ultimate question surrounding management-based strategies is when to use
them. Where do they fit into the existing array of policies and strategies for
environmental protection? More specifically, what is their relationship to conventional
55
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regulation?58 Participants argued that management-based strategies can be used both to
help firms come into full compliance with existing regulations as well as to take steps
that go beyond compliance with these regulations. In addition, some suggested that
management-based strategies will on occasion be appropriate alternatives to conventional
regulation.
Management-based strategies can lead firms to improve their compliance with
conventional technology and performance-based regulations by encouraging them to
identify the regulations they are subject to and develop plans to come into and maintain
compliance. Such compliance management systems often include regular, internal audits
to identify and correct instances of noncompliance. One participant described
management systems as an “insurance policy” for firms, while another explained that the
firms he works with adopt environmental management systems to avoid being “struck by
lightening” when the government inspectors come to pay a visit. Other participants,
though, expressed doubts about how important environmental management systems are
for ensuring compliance. For example, the study presented at the conference by Richard
N.L. Andrews of the University of North Carolina found no significant differences in the
reported levels of compliance between firms with and without management systems,
suggesting that firms can come into compliance even when they do not have formal
environmental management systems in place.59
Management systems can be used by companies to identify ways of reducing
environmental impacts not currently addressed by government regulation. For example,
the same study presented by Andrews found that the presence of management systems
58
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correlated with significant improvements in reported environmental impacts on
unregulated aspects of business – such as avoiding spills or conserving energy – but not
on regulated aspects such as air and water emissions.60 These findings suggest the
possibility that management-based strategies may be especially suited for environmental
problems that call for improved operational management and internal coordination –
problems that may be difficult to address through conventional regulatory strategies.
Management-based strategies implemented in the United States over the last
decade have all been implemented against the backdrop of extensive government
regulation. Several participants believed that management-based strategies will only
work (or will work best) when they have a credible regulatory threat operating in the
background. For example, the study by Jason Scott Johnston of the University of
Pennsylvania suggested that firms in the metal finishing industry were motivated to
participate in the Strategic Goals Program in order to preempt the adoption of tougher
water pollution regulations that EPA had proposed in 1995.61 Government agencies can
also use the existence of burdensome conventional regulation to offer rewards – namely,
waivers from existing regulations – to firms that demonstrate responsible environmental
management.62
Although environmental regulation has long been said to have many problems,
participants pointed out that management-based strategies have their own problems, some
59
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of which might be worse than those associated with conventional regulation. One
fundamental concern was that these new strategies, especially when they take the form of
government requirements for certain management processes, might intrude into the core
of business decision making. Putting management into private hands is, after all, what a
free enterprise system is all about. Government-imposed standards on environmental
management could be too rigid and inflexible, especially in the face of changing
conditions in global markets.
Some suggested that management is too difficult a matter for government to try to
influence. Good management involves much more than a flowchart or set of procedures
that exists on paper. Instead, it reflects the dynamics of organizations made up of people
and their relationships with each other. Even the most informed government officials
will not be as well-situated as private sector managers to know the best way to manage
businesses to return a profit and minimize impact on the environment. Moreover,
government itself is far from unified, so the possibility exists that different agencies could
require duplicative or incompatible management steps.
Other participants thought that requiring or encouraging firms to adopt
management systems could hardly do much harm, especially if they do not call for the
adoption of any new technologies or compliance with more stringent performance
standards. However, these same participants also wondered whether management
systems would do much good. Even though several empirical studies presented at the
conference show that management-based strategies can lead to environmental
62
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improvements,63 the substantive significance of these improvements needs to be
considered. Whether the benefits achieved are worth the costs that they impose on
economic activity has yet to be determined. One participant argued that if there are
problems with conventional regulation, the solution should be to fix those problems – not
to expect that management-based strategies will make up for the shortcomings of the
existing regulatory system. Another participant expressed concern that attention to
management-based strategies could be used to preempt other regulatory interventions that
would better serve society.64
In making decisions about management-based strategies, decision makers should
take into account the full range of possible impacts these strategies may generate. For
example, one participant suggested that one of the unintended consequences of trade
association mandates has been that numerous marginal firms leave those trade
associations that have imposed such mandates. A similar effect may also arise with
government programs when firms take actions to bring their use of specified chemicals
below levels that trigger the imposition of management-based regulation – even if doing
so does not lower substantially their overall level of environmental risk.65 To address
these kinds of side effects, management-based strategies should probably be combined
with other efforts by government, trade associations, and community groups to keep
firms shifting their operations off the radar screen.
A final concern with management-based strategies focused on issues of equity -both from the standpoint of the public as well as of industry itself. For the public, the
63
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flexibility inherent in a management-based approach may meanthat the same types of
facilities could emit different levels of pollution in different locales. Although
conventional regulation may be criticized for taking a one-size-fits-all approach, uniform
technology- or performance-based standards at least are uniform. For business, there is a
separate equity concern, namely that government inspectors and others who oversee
management-based programs will apply management standards in inconsistent or
inequitable ways. If what counts as good management is not clearly specified, this will
give discretion to auditors and may result in an uneven application of sanctions or
rewards.66
Equity issues also arise from the distinction between actions and attitudes.
Management-based strategies work by discriminating between firms based on whether
they have in place certain easily observable management practices, and consequently
these strategies will be vulnerable to criticism that firms are selected for reward or
punishment based on the wrong criteria. Some firms may be rewarded simply because
they go through the motions of adopting a management system, while other firms that are
really making a difference in reducing pollution could go unrewarded because they lack
the requisite formalities in their management practices.
Participants recognized that management-based strategies have both advantages
and disadvantages. As such, no participant advocated eliminating the existing system of
environmental regulation altogether in favor of adopting only management-based
strategies. Rather, the challenge for decision makers will be to find the optimal
66
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intervention for the specific problems and circumstances they confront. In some cases,
the best option will be to continue to rely on conventional regulatory strategies. Yet in
other cases, as some of the research papers and conference discussion suggested, there
will be good reason to consider using a management-based strategy. Management-based
strategies may be particularly useful in order to influence the practices of a highly diverse
set of facilities, collect information that will help motivate private sector managers or
activate influential stakeholders, or improve performance among facilities or with respect
to specific problems that are simply not amenable to other regulatory approaches.67

Conclusion
Management-based strategies are increasingly gaining the attention of leaders in
both the public and private sectors. These strategies can take many forms, but they are
linked by their emphasis on improving management and thereby seeking to contribute
indirectly to improved environmental outcomes. They hold out the promise that firms
will gather information needed to improve their environmental performance – and that
they will respond to their acquisition of this information by reducing or preventing
pollution. By providing incentives for firms to identify their own risks and select their
own mitigation solutions, management-based strategies are flexible and seek to use the
private sector’s informational advantage for the public good.
The research presented at the Regulatory Policy Program’s conference suggests
that, while still relatively new and unstudied, management-based strategies may
sometimes have a role to play in environmental protection. Management style does
67
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appear to shape the environmental performance of firms, so strategies that influence
private sector management can be considered at least plausible candidates for bringing
about environmental improvements. The studies presented at the conference have broken
new ground by empirically investigating the impact of management-based strategies.
Some, but not all, of these studies confirm that management-based strategies can
contribute to reductions in pollution. Of course, the overall impact of any strategy
depends on a variety of factors, including the incentives it provides to firms to make
improvements and the type of environmental problem being addressed.
The research presented at the conference adds to an emerging body of empirical
knowledge about public and private sector strategies to leverage managers’ efforts to
improve environmental conditions. The conference discussion summarized in this article
has highlighted both the advantages and disadvantages of management-based strategies,
so that decision makers can have realistic expectations about what these strategies will be
able to achieve. While improvements in environmental management can produce some
results, this does not mean that the results will always be dramatic nor does it mean that
management-based strategies will be appropriate for all problems.
Further research will be needed to inform decision makers interested in
management-based strategies. As one participant argued, just as medicine has moved
toward evidence-based practice, so too should environmental policy move closer toward
evidence-based decision making through greater reliance on empirical research.68 By
bringing together leading researchers with key public and private sector leaders to discuss
68
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a variety of new empirical studies, the Regulatory Policy Program’s conference has shed
light on an emerging approach toward environmental protection and provided a
foundation upon which future research can be based.
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